Michigan Law Review
Volume 77

Issue 3

1979

A Note on Corporate America
Simon M. Lorne

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Simon M. Lorne, A Note on Corporate America, 77 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1979).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol77/iss3/20

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

A NOTE ON CORPORATE AMERICA
Simon M. Lorne*
THE ATIACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA: THE CORPORATE ISSUES
SoURCEBOOK. Edited by M. Bruce Johnson. New York: McGrawHill. 1978. Pp. xv, 348. $14.50.
The first copy of The Attack on Corporate America that I
received was sent to me by a former teaching colleague who commented in his transmittal letter that "considering its source [The
Law and Economics Center of the University of Miami School of
Law] [it] is likely to be a hymn of praise to the free enterprise
system." My colleague was right . . . and wrong. Considering its
source it was likely to be a hymn of praise. And, indeed, its sixtyone essays are in large part, if not unanimously, in praise of the
free enterprise system. However, when sixty-one essays occupy
299 pages of text (my pocket calculator advises that the average
is 4.9 pages per essay), it is difficult fairly to characterize the
result as a "hymn." When the four major headings are
"Sociopolitical Analogies and the Corporation," "Control of the
Corporation," "State Versus Federal Chartering of Corporations," and "Corporate Power and the Market," any such characterization becomes most implausible.
It appears, then, on its face (and the appearance is thoroughly substantiated by the contents) that the volume is too
broad in scope, and the individual essays too abbreviated, for the
book successfully to accomplish the mission that I would design
for it. To say that, however, may not be to level any great criticism at the work. For its mission may not be that which I would
design, and it does not advertise itself as anything more (although
certainly nothing less) than "The Corporate Issues Sourcebook."
And to some substantial extent, it may be that it does an adequate job of providing a source from which one can discern a
variety of corporate issues. But it strains credulity to suggest that
the sole raison d'etre of this work is providing a shopping list of
issues. And, indeed, Henry Manne, founder and director of The
Law and Economics Center, suggests in his preface that more is
intended: "Many persons studying this work will be surprised to
learn that the weight of high-grade scholarship about the modern
corporate system supports strongly the conclusion that unregu* Member, California Bar. A.B. 1967, Occidental College; J.D. 1970, University of
Michigan.-Ed.
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lated corporate capitalism functions far more desirably than various louder voices have led us to believe." That banner is carried
throughout the work. Unfortunately, Professor Manne is guilty
once again of overstatement. It is a shame that one who brings
as much innovative and provocative thought as does Professor
Manne to the field of corporate and securities regulation tends so
often to reduce his arguments to political, if not actual, absurdity, and to continue to defend them.
"Many persons studying this work. . . " Unlikely. Some, no
doubt, will study it. Many, I hope, will use it and consult it. But
that many will study it is simply not to be expected. And if they
did-without undertaking considerable additional effort to read
much more broadly-they would no doubt be frustrated by the
results of their efforts. How does one "study" a group of sixty-one
five-page essays?
". . . will be surprised. . . " Even less likely. The level of
commitment required to "study" this volume-if it can be done
-is such that only those who are already dedicated to the conclusions may be capable of accomplishing it. It would be astonishing if those few individuals were to be surprised.
". . . to learn that the weight of high-grade scholarship
about the modern corporate system . .. "Impossible. Some of the
sixty-one essays are excellent. Some are not. But they are certainly not, as a group, capable of conveying to the reader any
clear notion of what "the weight of high-grade scholarship" truly
holds. I tend to believe the premise of Professor Manne's preface.
I have a great deal of faith in the social efficiency of capitalism. I
even think myself capable of "high-grade" scholarship. Yet even
I could not fairly draw conclusions from this book as to what a
large group-much less the weight-of high-grade scholars would
conclude. Furthermore, the book does not purport to be a dialogue that would expose the thoughts of both sides. It is rather
in the nature of rebuttal, and to draw firm conclusions from it
would be both difficult and dangerous.
". . . supports strongly the conclusion. . . " See supra, but
read it with even more emphasis.
". . . that unregulated corporate capitalism functions. . . "
No such tenet is put forth in any of the essays, nor should it be.
We have never seen unregulated corporate capitalism. Indeed, it
may be that the essence of incorporation-made possible only by
enabling legislation-implies regulation. Whether or not that is
true, it is certainly true that we have never experienced unregulated corporations, for the world's attraction to economic regula-
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tion predates the wide-spread use of the corporate format. And
it is difficult to imagine the existence of unregulated corporate
capitalism in the modern environment.
". . . far more desirably than various louder voices have led
us to believe." Possible, assuming the editorial "us" is in
use-certainly those louder voices have seldom led Professor
Manne to believe very much. Even with that assumption, however, and even combining the last two quoted phrases for fairness's sake, one could not fairly conclude so much from this volume. The broadest legitimate conclusion is that the views of the
louder voices are not likely to be true, and that some less, or
different, regulation than we now have would be beneficial.
This book does fulfill a function. It does present a point of
view that has too often been ignored. It does provide a forum for
sensible views. But its reach exceeds its grasp by too much. To
respond in such a relatively short book to an attack as widespread
as that on the modern corporation is impossible. No matter how
concisely written, it is difficult for five pages to respond to fifty,
much less five hundred or five thousand. Time and again, the
reader's response-even when the reader is already a true believer
(as I am)-is more likely to be "Good point!" or "Interesting!"
than "Q.E.D."
As one who has at times been rash enough to suggest that
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" was indeed, and even is, a useful
basis for analysis, rather than a silly historical eccentricity which
economic history survived, perhaps I should not be heard to criticize any attempt to give greater credence to views with which I
fundamentally agree. But even I-perhaps because I was reading
the book rather than using it as a source book-found myself
bored well short of its end. The various essays are each titled with
a question. (E.g., "Does advertising persuade consumers to buy
things they do not need?" [no], "Is corporate executive compensation excessive?" [no], "Does antitrust activity increase economic welfare?" [no], etc.) The answers to the questions posed
are overwhelmingly, if not universally, in the negative. And after
not very long one becomes tired, no matter how strong one's initial allegiance, of five-page essays advising that government involvement is bad, and that present corporate activity is good,
acceptable, beneficial, and quite possibly beyond reproach.
Indeed, the reaction of even this reader was to begin to focus
upon the areas in which modern corporate behavior is at fault, if
not to sympathize with the "louder voices" to which Professor
Manne referred. It seems entirely plausible that within the con-
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fines of what I would call strict conservatism one might disagree
with much of the underlying theme of the volume. For example,
to the extent that the essays in the book deal with the environment, they tend to suggest that attempts by the government to
force corporations to confine environmental pollution are wrong
because they will increase prices, destroy jobs, and so on (although, again, some of the better essays do refrain from that sort
of excess). However, it strikes me as fully within the dogma to
suggest (as these better essays do) that if a particular method of
production creates external costs such as pollution, the market
mechanism of capitalism can operate efficiently only if those
costs are internalized, and the government must in all likelihood
be used to accomplish that end. For example, in a purely theoretical system (thanks to the wonders of theory) one would suggest
that if a method of production by manufacturer A creates pollution causing X million dollars of damage annually, then the
manufacturer should be taxed at X million dollars, with the proceeds used to compensate those who suffered from the pollution.
Only in that way c.an manufacturer B, whose methods do not
create such pollution, properly compete with manufacturer A, so
that the marketplace can make the decision that self-interest
properly requires (we embrace again Adam Smith). That is not,
of course, to say that manufacturer A should be prohibited from
polluting, for the citizenry may well prefer to suffer with the pollution and effectively (as a result of the tax redistribution) acquire the pollutant-causing products at a lower price. That
remains a decision that is properly the citizens' to make and not
the government's. Given the practical impossibility of measuring
compensation, and of properly redistributing it, one might even
argue reasonably about whether manufacturer A should be taxed
in some estimated appropriate amount, or should rather be required to eliminate the pollution. However, the tendency of the
essays in this book is simply to assert that there should be
neither tax nor prohibition, with the implied result that manufacturers may properly obtain disproportionate benefits through
being able to ignore social costs.
Similar analyses can be made with respect to many of the
topics covered in the book. Some of the essays are excellent, some
shallow. Those which are excellent lead the reader to believe that
with more development, with more examination, with more analysis, they could be conclusive. Unfortunately, few of them are
given that essential development. And as the hearing officer advised opposing counsel in the first administrative hearing I ever
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attended, "being able to prove it doesn't inspire me, Mr. Jones.
If you can, please do so, forthwith."
But the real flaw of this work is not so much in its predictability as in its failure to examine in a constructive way the real
and significant problems that do face modern American free enterprise. To my mind, the greatest of those is not unique to the
private sector, but rather is one which besets all economic activity in this country at the present time, both private and public.
It is simply this: While the theory of rational economic behavior
depends in substantial part upon long-term rationality, our decisions seem more and more often to be made on a short-term basis.
While John Maynard Keynes's analyses of political economics
have been vastly distorted-so that he seems to be in popular
disrepute today for unfounded reasons fully as much as_ he was
the hero of yesterday for equally unfounded reasons-we have
accepted completely his recognition that "in the long run we are
all dead," and we seem generally to have chosen not to let that
frame of reference affect our decisions.
That recognition is not, of course, novel: It may be traced
directly from the pioneering work of Berle and Means, 1 and their
recognition (even forty years ago) that modern corporations are
typically controlled by managers rather than by owners. What is,
perhaps, if not new, then at least rather more pressingly important than it has been, is the recognition that we are critically in
need of long-run decision-making, yet incredibly unable to obtain
it. In part, that is no doubt a result of the increasing impact of
short-run government decisions on corporate behavior.
An aspect of the labor relations field provides an obvious
example. It is not at all difficult to understand why a succession
of mayors in New York, seeking reelection and needing to please
the electorate immediately, compromised the future while quelling the immediate unrest by agreeing with labor unions to provide
pension benefits that were clearly beyond the City's means (at
least in combination with the City's other well-intentioned but
perhaps excessive social programs). We all know what happened
to New York,2 and in the publicity that followed its near collapses
in the 1974-1978 period, we became aware that New York was far
from alone in its unfunded pension schemes. The City of Los
Angeles is thought to be in reasonable fiscal health, as large mu1. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PR!vATE PROPERTY (1933).
2. See generally SEC, STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK (1977).
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nicipalities go, but even it is reported to have unfunded pension
liabilities in the billions of dollars.
With some, but considerably less, publicity, much the same
thing has happened to our corporations. Some two years ago
Fortune magazine ran a most significant article discussing the
unfunded future pension obligations of major corporations in this
country. 3 But while the SEC has since then become embroiled in
substantial controversy with the accounting profession regarding
questions such as the capitalization of lease obligations and accounting for inflation, 4 relatively little attention (at least of the
publicized sort) has been given to unfunded pension obligations
or the assumptions on which they may be viewed as being
funded. 5 Yet surely such issues are worthy of our concern-unless
they, like the prospect of nuclear war, are simply too great and
fearsome to contemplate.
Why has this state of affairs come to exist? The answer is
simply this: that by and large, managers are scrutinized on the
basis of current results. The strike that is not solved today is
likely to have a far more meaningful impact on the executives
responsible, on the way in which corporations are perceived by
the stock market and the public, and on similar interests, than
are future pension obligations which cannot or can scarcely be
met. They are a problem to be solved by tomorrow's managers,
who will have to worry at that time.
While the short-run/long-run tradeoff may be most apparent
in the context of labor strikes and pension benefits, the difficulties seen in that context recur in a number of areas. In the public
sector, of course, many of those systemic failures have been
chronicled over the years-thousands of "pork barrel" projects,
the failure to establish an energy policy that would prevent what
is probably the too cheap distribution of oil and gas, and the like.
All are the result of concern with short-run appearances, and with
3. Ehrbar, Those Pension Plans Are Even Weaker Than You Think, FORTUNE, Nov.
1977, at 104.
4. See, e.g., Unaudited Replacement Cost Information-Replacement Cost lnforma•
tion Required in Filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Statement
on Auditing Standard No. 18 (May 1977); Lease Accounting and Disclosure Rules, SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 225, (Aug. 31, 1977); SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No,
7 (May 23, 1976); SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 9; SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin
No. 10 (Aug. 1, 1976).
5. The text no doubt overstates my case. The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, and its legislative history, give substantial attention to pension funding problems,
However, that statute, and the related history, give relatively scant attention to the
investor's need for information in the area. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1976).
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reelection, that understandably, if not acceptably, outweighs
concern with long-term consequences.
In many instances the private sector is only slightly better.
Private-sector managers-as opposed to owners-tend also to
devote their primary attention to the problems of today, those
that will affect this year's bonus and next year's promotion. The
rush of the late 1960s toward conglomeration on the basis of the
modern Adam Smith's "super money" 6-paper stock certificates-is an example. How many senseless combinations were
made in that era on a foundation of nothing but mutual
greed-the greed of buyers to acquire, through the wonders of
accounting, 7 "instant earnings," and the greed of sellers to dispose of their companies for paper certificates supposedly representing far more than the worth of the company? The rush of
failures and disposals that followed gives clear witness to that
greed. Certainly, some acquisitions of that period were, or became
by chance, mutually profitable. But countless others were foolhardy rushes to obtain today's paper fortune, mindless of tomorrow's reality.
This is not a sensible state of affairs and is probably a far
more meaningful and legitimate problem than many of those
discussed in the book. Yet it would not be in keeping with the
theory of the book to assess such problems, for they suggest that
all is not right with free enterprise today and that there may be
a proper role for someone, somehow to play.
I do not have, at least in these brief pages, a solution to the
problem. Nor do I expect that my raising it in this context will
cause the attention to be given to it that is required. However,
the dimensions of the problem should trouble us all. Our whole
society has become oriented toward this day's results, this day's
profits-and. the long term has become coincident with that required by the Internal Revenue Code for long-term capital gains.
By and large (with some notable exceptions), decisions regarding
environmental matters, hiring policies, accounting practices, and
the like focus upon the short term.
There are, of course, some bright lights upon the horizon.
The development of the employee stock-ownership plan, if used
seriously as a means of retirement planning, may significantly tie
the future compensation of today's managers to the future success
of the enterprise. It is an attempt to make managers again into
6. 'A. SMITH,' SuPERMONEY (1972). See also J. BROOKS, THE Go-Go YEARS (1973).
7. See A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING (1972).
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owners. However, while I am not aware of any statistical examination, I would hazard a guess that such plans are of importance
only with respect to a minor part of the economic power of this
country.
Increased attention to the role of the board of directors, with
a shift toward independent directors, 8 is probably a more meaningful recent phenomenon. That body, to the extent that it actually controls the corporation, may serve to inject into decisionmaking processes the needed attention to long-run concerns. The
importance of that relatively recent development-which was in
large measure the result of government prodding-will be seen
only in the future.
Perhaps it is inappropriate to criticize the particular work
under scrutiny for failing to examine realistically some of the
serious problems of free enterprise in this country. Perhaps this
volume does perform a useful service in providing a background
of readings sympathetic to free enterprise, and in opposing the
"louder voices" to which its preface refers. But works of this type,
no less than works of the Nader variety, tend toward a polarization that is neither helpful nor enlightening. At a conference in
San Diego in January 1979, Professor (presently General Counsel
to the Treasury Department) Robert H. Mundheim presented an
important response to modern concerns with foreign payments
"scandals" and many recent "corporate governance" issues. He
warned that while there have been some serious abuses, and that
they certainly need correction, it may be error to give too much
attention to a "B-" on the "conduct and deportment" side of the
report card and to ignore the "A's" that our corporations have
achieved in arithmetic, english, and history. That sort of criticism-that search for balance and recognition of the value of the
modern corporation-is needed and useful. Too often this volume
tends to ignore balance and to react blindly to critics.
Henry Manne's Center undoubtedly fulfills an important
function in educating those trained in the law to the world of
economics and in presenting, typically, the view of the loyal minority. There is no doubt but that it, like this product of the
Center, is a useful and important force. I, however, for one, hope
that it will become more of a positive force toward seeking ra8. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that the ratio of "outside" to "inside"
directors at industrial concerns is now 60-40. Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1979 at 1, col.
5 (Western ed.). See generally Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors:
Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REv. 581 (1978).
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tional solutions to the problems that free enterprise does face, and
that it will candidly recognize those problems, rather than being
merely the voice of opposition.

